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Probability theory as extended logic is completed such that essentially any probability may be
determined. This is done by considering propositional logic (as opposed to predicate logic) as
syntactically sufficient and imposing a symmetry from propositional logic. It is shown how the
notions of ‘possibility’ and ‘property’ may be sufficiently represented in propositional logic such
that 1) the principle of indifference drops out and becomes essentially combinatoric in nature and
2) one may appropriately represent assumptions where one assumes there is a space of possibilities
but does not assume the size of the space.
INTRODUCTION
This article is a summation of current and ongoing
research. Some work in the literature may not yet be
properly considered.
It can be argued that Bayesian probability theory is the
general framework for scientific prediction and inference
[1, 2]. It is a calculus for normative statements
P (A|B),
where A and B are propositions. These statements en-
code degrees of belief/plausibility of A, given B. Fully
half of probability theory is encoded into two simple
rules1,
Product rule: P (AB|C) = P (A|C)P (B|AC)
= P (B|C)P (A|BC)
Sum rule: P (A|B) + P (A¯|B) = 1,
from which we have a generalised sum rule
P (A+B|C) = P (A|C) + P (B|C) − P (AB|C).
These rules give relationships between different proba-
bilities but do not constrain the probabilities enough to
uniquely determine them [14]. This is the incompleteness
of probability theory.
In particular, in inference we often want to determine
the probability of a hypothesis H given data D and per-
haps some background knowledge I,
P (H |DI) =
P (D|HI)P (H |I)
P (D|I)
.
1 The notation we are using corresponds to AB = A and B,A +
B = A or B, and A¯ = not A
Probabilities like P (H |I) are often called ‘priors’. These
need to be determined to work out P (H |DI).
Many methods have been invented to determine priors
for different situations. If one is a Subjective Bayesian
where a probability is a degree of belief relative to some
agent, the (perhaps counterfactual) agent is free to
just choose the value of their priors based on intuition
or gut instinct. If one is an Objective Bayesian, one
wants to find methods of derivation such that each
probability assignation can be considered unique and
agent independent (although different agents may make
different assumptions and so may still consider different
degrees of plausibility; i.e., Objective Bayesians still
consider probability theory subjective in one sense).
Such methods include Laplace’s principle of indifference,
transformation group methods, and maximum entropy
methods [3]. However, methods such as these are not
always of use for calculation of generic priors.
I propose a method whereby in principle any prior may
be determined. Moreover, it is a method for calculating
essentially2 any3 probability. This will be accomplished
by completing the Objective Bayesian approach of prob-
ability theory as extended logic [1, 4] by imposing a sym-
metry and treating probability theory as syntactically
complete.
LOGIC AND EXTENDED LOGIC
To understand the completion I am proposing, we
must understand certain aspects of logic that I propose
2 We shall be using a finite sets policy where one always starts
with finite sets and only then takes limits. See [1] for detailed
motivation.
3 There is also no general method for calculating factors P (D|HI)
- called likelihoods - unless H predicts D or D¯ for certain; the
calculation often reduces to calculation of a prior.
2to impose on probability theory.
Consider the following logical argument:
A
B
∴ C
This is not a valid argument. The basic propositions A
and B may have meanings for us that are not reflected in
the formulation of the argument. For example, we may
want the correspondence
A : Socrates is a man.
B : If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal.
C : Socrates is mortal.
A better formulation of the argument will then be to use
logical implication A→ C instead of B. We then get the
new4 argument,
A
A→ C
∴ C
which is a valid argument. One may see from this a
trivial aspect of logic; the validity of an argument is
dependent on the structure of the argument. One needs
to sufficiently define the structure in order to make an
argument that is appropriate.
More importantly, the structure of an argument is the
only thing the validity is dependent upon. Any influence
to the validity of a logical argument beyond the form
of the stated argument is extra-logical. One may have
extra-logical influences in two ways; the choice of rules
that define the logic used may be changed such that one
uses a different logic; and one may have some meaning
for a proposition in mind that is not defined within
the argument. For this second influence, we shall take
the position that one has insufficiently represented ones
premises and thus the argument is not well formulated.
For the first influence, this is a legitimate endeavour.
We shall however stick to propositional logic and see
how far we can go.
An argument is also independent of the labels one
uses for the propositions; what is important is logical
structure.
4 Note here we are not considering uppercase propositions to be
propositional variables; within each argument, propositions are
constant. It is the arguments that change.
The position we are taking is sometimes called a syn-
tactic logical interpretation of probability theory. Many
philosophers take the position that there is meaning
for some propositions relevant to scientific inference
and prediction that cannot be defined through logical
structure alone. These issues and others are discussed in
the remarks.
We start by following Cox [4] who derived the product
and sum rules from basic desiderata to extend logic. In
the system, our primitive objects are degrees of plausi-
bility
A|B,
of A given B, that are equal to real numbers. Probabil-
ities are positive, continuous, monotonic functions, f , of
plausibilities
P (A|B) = f(A|B).
The function, f , is chosen such that certainty corre-
sponds to the number 1. This choice is arbitrary but
it leads to the particularly simple forms of the product
and sum rules we have given.
We shall consider a degree of plausibility as directly
analogous to a logical argument. This means two things:
1. The value of a plausibility (analogous to the va-
lidity of an argument) is dependent on only the ex-
plicit logical structure. From now on, any non-basic
proposition will be written as Z[Ai] or Z[A1, ..., An]
as opposed to Z. When calculating a prior for
Z[Ai], the product and sum rules will constrain it
to be functionally related to probabilities of basic
propositions. We may then isolate the probabilities
that cannot be calculated by using only the product
and sum rules, and the rules of Boolean algebra.
2. Directly related to the above, the value of a degree
of plausibility will not depend on the labels used on
basic propositions. This gives us a powerful trick
that is fundamental to derivations [1] of indifference
and transformation group methods. For example,
P (A1|X [A1, A2]) = P (A2|X [A2, A1]).
If X [A1, A2] is permutation symmetric; i.e.,
X [A1, A2] = X [A2, A1], then
P (A1|X [A1, A2]) = P (A2|X [A1, A2]),
which gives us a non-trivial constraint. Relabelling
can also be used for individual probabilities sepa-
rately within a functional relationship. For exam-
ple,
P (A1 +A2|A3) = P (A1|A3) + P (A2|A3)− P (A1A2|A3)
= 2P (A1|A3)− P (A1A2|A3).
3EXCLUSIVITY, EXHAUSTIVITY AND
INDIFFERENCE
In nearly every probability calculation exclusivity and
exhaustivity for some set of possibilities are (usually im-
plicitly) assumed. Exclusivity means that if you assume
that Ai is true, then you may infer that any Aj , in some
set {Ai}
n
i=1 where i 6= j, must be false. Exhaustivity
means that you assume at least one of the set {Ai}
n
i=1 is
true. These assumptions are often parametrised by the
conditions
P (AiAj |I[Ai]) = P (Ai|I[Ai])δij ;
P (
n∑
i=1
Ai|I[Ai]) = 1.
If one wants to write a probability in terms of a mixture
of others in the normal way, then it is necessary to make
these assumptions;
P (B|X [Ai, B]) = P (B
n∑
i=1
Ai|X [Ai, B])
=
n∑
i=1
P (BAi|X [Ai, B])
=
n∑
i=1
P (Ai|X [Ai, B])P (B|AiX [Ai, B]).
If one doesn’t assume exclusivity, then one gets extra
terms in the above equation.
One may consider exclusivity and exhaustivity as the
sufficient logical definition of ‘possibility’ and ‘property’
[8, 11]. A property may be considered a coarse grained
possibility; for example, any classical observable in
Hamiltonian mechanics segments the space of possible
states, defining a property. In particular, the energy
of a system is a property with various values of the
energy related to various sets of possible states. The
meaning that differentiates different types of properties
and possibilities is defined by other logical relationships
one assumes. So energy is a classification differentiated
by causal structure (i.e., the equations one uses); we
assume that if a system has a certain value for its energy
at a certain time and is isolated, then the system will
have the same energy at a later time; we have logical
correlation.
One problem is that the conditions for exclusivity and
exhaustivity are not derived from the explicit form of
our assumptions I[Ai]. The explicit form of I[Ai] for the
simple set {A1, A2, A3} is as follows:
M3[Ai] = A1A¯2A¯3 + A¯1A2A¯3 + A¯1A¯2A3 + A¯1A¯2A¯3
for exclusivity and
X3[Ai] = A1A2A3 +A1A2A¯3 +A1A¯2A3
+A¯1A2A3 +A1A¯2A¯3 + A¯1A2A¯3
+A¯1A¯2A3
for exhaustivity. This gives us
I3[Ai] =M3[Ai]X3[Ai] = A1A¯2A¯3 + A¯1A2A¯3 + A¯1A¯2A3.
These functions have been written in a non-minimal
way where the function is a sum of terms with each
term being a product of Ai’s and A¯i’s and containing
Ai’s for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n for some n. In this form - which
is often called disjunctive normal form - every term is
exclusive by definition. Every propositional function
can be written in this form. Each function can then be
associated with a subset of the power set of {Ai}
n
i=1,
{Ai}
p
, where each term is associated with an element
of {Ai}
p
. The sum of terms associated with {Ai}
p
are exhaustive by definition. This will give us great
flexibility in calculation.
Let us now calculate
P (A1|I3[Ai]) =
P (A1A¯2A¯3|)
P (A1A¯2A¯3|) + P (A¯1A2A¯3|) + P (A¯1A¯2A3|)
=
1
3
×
P (A1A¯2A¯3|)
P (A1A¯2A¯3|)
=
1
3
,
where we have used relabelling. Probabilities of the form
P (.|) refer to probabilities with minimal assumptions.
This will be defined later. Indifference can be seen
as fundamentally combinatoric in nature, where the
probability is directly related to the number of ways one
may assign a single non-negated proposition in a product
of propositions. We can generalise to any {Ai}
n
i=1 in a
simple manner.
One aspect of the above derivation is that the prob-
abilities cancel out such that they do not need to be
calculated. This is suggestive of why indifference could
be derived in the past [1] without needing to go beyond
the basic sum and product rules.
The above derivation also shows us that exclusivity and
exhaustivity are not just necessary but also sufficient in
deriving indifference.
DETERMINING GENERIC PROBABILITIES
We define a working set {Ai}
n
i=1 as the set of all propo-
sitions we are working with for a particular probability.
4This set may be made arbitrarily large:
P (A|B) = P (A|B)P (C + C¯|AB)
= P (A[C + C¯]|B)
= P (A|[C + C¯]B).
From this one can see we may add an arbitrary number
of tautologies to the premises. One may consider this
arbitrariness an important criterion for probability
theory; we want our probabilities to be stable under
arbitrary additions of tautologies to our assumptions. It
is interesting that the product and sum rules give this
to us for free.
An important thing to note is that we are allowing
propositions like C in the conclusions that have no
representation in the premises.
Probabilities with minimal assumptions may be writ-
ten as
P (Z[A1, ..., An]|) = P (Z[A1, ..., An]|Qn[A1, ..., An]),
where Qn[Ai] =
∏n
i=1(Ai + A¯i). We may thus consider
probabilities P (.|) as ones either assuming nothing or
only tautologies.
Let us now turn our attention to a generic probability
P (Z[Ai]|Y [Ai]).
We may write
P (Z[Ai]|Y [Ai]) =
P (Z[Ai]Y [Ai]|)
P (Y [Ai]|)
.
Both of these factors may be written as sums of terms
of the form P (A1...AiA¯i+1...A¯n|). These terms may
be decomposed using the product rule. At this point
the derivations of Jaynes [1] and Cox [4] give us no
further support. Jaynes appeared [1] (P35) to consider
probability theory complete as he expected one to
always have background knowledge to determine the
terms. Here we are explicitly assuming only tautologies
with probabilities P (.|) and hence cannot rely on such
background knowledge. Moreover, as we are aiming at
generality, we do not want to rely on such background
knowledge.
To determine the terms, consider the following symme-
try: The validity of an argument is invariant under swap-
ping a basic proposition A with its negation A¯ in both
the premises and the conclusions. Moreover, the swap-
ping symmetry A↔ A¯ is a symmetry of logical structure.
It may be seen as directly related to the double negation
rule; imposing the symmetry on a trivial identity gives
us the rule:
A¯ = A¯→ A = A¯.
Consider also that a possible state of affairs may be
referred to by either A or A¯, with both choices giving
equal consequences for argumentation. The two propo-
sitions are defined in contrast to one another (their
truth values are opposed) and are not distinguished
within the system in any other way. This lack of
distinguishing factors is made more apparent when
possibility is seen as an explicit extra assumption; the
proposition A¯ does not by definition mean that a propo-
sition from a set of possibilities, other than A, must
be true. Such meaning comes from an assumption In[Ai].
I assert that our degrees of plausibility must satisfy
the symmetry in order to not introduce an extra-logical
bias into our framework. This may be considered part
of the desideratum of consistency used in [1].
Consider notation xjk = P (A|A1...AjB¯1...B¯k). From
our symmetry, one may impose5
x
j+1
k = x
j
k+1 ∀j, k ≥ 0. (1)
We now prove a lemma: ∀j, k ≥ 0, if xjk = P (A|), then
x
j
k+1 = P (A|).
Proof: Assume xj0k0 = P (A|) for some j0, k0 ≥ 0. Then
P (A|) = P (A[Aq + A¯q]|A1...Aj0 B¯1...B¯k0)
= P (A|)P (A|A1...Aj0AqB¯1...B¯k0)
+ {1− P (A|)}P (A|A1...Aj0 B¯1...B¯k0A¯q)
= P (A|)xj0+1k0 + {1− P (A|)} x
j0
k0+1
Then by eq.(1), xj0k0+1 = P (A|). 
From our lemma and (1), we get by induction from
x00 = P (A|),
∀j, k ≥ 0, xjk = P (A|).
Now see
P (A1...AjB¯1...B¯k|) =
j∏
l=1
k∏
r=1
P (Al|µl) {1− P (Br|νr)}
= P j(A|) {1− P (A|)}
k
,
where µl and νr are products of various A’s and B’s. To
determine P (A|), we impose the symmetry again:
A| = A¯|.
5 This condition is imposed on the plausibilities but may be stated
in terms of probabilities.
5From this condition one arrives at
P (A|) =
1
2
.
Our generic probability then becomes
P (Z[Ai]|Y [Ai]) =
M
N
2n−m,
where M and N are just the number of terms in
Z[Ai]Y [Ai] and Y [Ai] respectively when the functions are
written in minimal disjunctive normal form. Moreover,
M can heuristically be thought of as an unnormalised
overlap between Z[Ai] and Y [Ai]. The numbers m and
n are the numbers of basic propositions in the terms of
Z[Ai]Y [Ai] and Y [Ai] respectively, written in minimal
disjunctive normal form.
APPLICATIONS
The precision and generality of our scientific state-
ments are directly related to the precision and generality
of the language used to make the statements. With the
formulation of probability theory I have just proposed,
we are able to determine precise probabilistic statements
for a greater variety of situations then we were able to
before. Immediate applications include situations where
we do not or cannot assume exhaustivity and exclusivity:
1. We can calculate probabilities for propositions Ai
when we know only that they are one of m exhaus-
tive possibilities;
P (Ai|Xm[Ai]) =
2m−1
2m − 1
.
2. Consider a situation similar to one presented by
Walley [5]: We have a bag of marbles. Suppose
we know that they are labelled in a distinguish-
able way. In particular, they are numbered and we
know there is a marble that is labelled with ‘1’. We
know nothing about the number of marbles in the
bag (perhaps the bag is magical, with the ability to
hold an unlimited number of marbles). We want to
know the probability that if we pick a marble from
the bag, that marble will be the one labelled with
‘1’. This will generally depend on our knowledge of
how we pick the marble. We are not interested in
this particular aspect and if we know our method
of picking cannot discriminate the labels, we may
neglect this knowledge for our current purposes.
Walley and others have proposed solutions to prob-
lems of this sort which go beyond the Bayesian
framework. One sought after property of a prob-
ability in this situation is called regrouping in-
variance; i.e., it should somehow be invariant to
changes in the ‘size of the sample space’. This pre-
supposes that our probabilities are defined in terms
of ‘sample spaces’.
Within the framework just proposed the solution
requires only properly stating the salient assump-
tions; we have positive knowledge that there is a set
of exclusive and exhaustive possibilities, we just do
not know the size of the set. An appropriate prob-
ability will then be of the form
lim
n→∞
P (A1|
n∑
j=1
Ij [Ai]).
Note, assuming
∑n
j=1 Ij [Ai] does not assume the
various sample spaces are exclusive to each other.
Exclusivity of sample spaces would require ad-
ditional assumptions and change the probability.
This is just one example of the precise choices we
could make in our assumptions, exemplifying the
generality of our approach.
3. Quantum theory has severe ontological problems.
Our difficulty in solving these problems may be
an insufficient formulation of probability theory [6].
Most if not all no-go theorems for ontological mod-
els of quantum theory [7–11] implicitly assume ex-
clusivity and exhaustivity for the space of ontolog-
ical states. The framework presented here allows
for a whole class of models, which do not assume
exclusivity and exhaustivity, to be explored.
REMARKS
The probabilistic framework here is considered as a
symbolic system rather than a system of functions or
measures on a predefined set. The framework is general
enough to deal with situations where sets of possibilities
are not assumed. The principle of indifference is derived
as a consequence of our ability to relabel and the
explication of the assumptions we implicitly make to
define possibility. Indifference is thus not a principle
imposed a priori or arbitrarily.
Probability theory as extended logic is completed by
imposing a symmetry from propositional logic.
The degree to which one is convinced by the frame-
work proposed here partly depends on whether one is
convinced that propositional logic is sufficient for the
task of scientific inference. We have seen how one may
represent basic notions of possibility and property while
still maintaining logical consistency. What propositional
logic does not do are universals. I argue that universals
are not directly relevant for scientific inference; a
scientist would never be able to test the statement ‘all
6ravens are black’.
I propose the notion of universality is related to
notions of induction and simplicity.
The framework just proposed does not directly justify
induction. This is a good thing. An approach [12] by
Carnap - that has similar motivations to the approach
here - tries to build induction directly into the frame-
work. One problem is that the inductive predictions do
not take into account ones assumptions; whether or not
one predicts a sequence to continue at all and precisely
how one predicts this depends on ones assumptions.
Moreover, I submit these things should only depend on
ones assumptions; if you make no assumptions you have
no reason to predict the continuation of a sequence.
One may still perform inductive reasoning given cer-
tain assumptions such as a constant causal mechanism.
There is, however, still a problem of induction: One may
make valid predictions based on assumptions but those
assumptions may not necessarily be justified.
The Bayesian framework has some built in notion of
simplicity [1](Ch.20). Consider two sets of propositional
functions we’ll call models, Ωm and Ωm+1, where
Ωm is parametrised by m parameters and Ωm+1 by
m + 1 parameters. Suppose the m + 1’th parameter
is θm+1 and the subset Ωm+1|θm+1=0 has a one to
one correspondence with Ωm where each element in
both sets is identified with one that produces the same
likelihood for some data D[Ai]. We may take Ωm
and Ωm+1 as compound models, i.e., models where
the parameters are unknown. If the elements are
exclusive for both Ωm and Ωm+1 and the point in the
parameter space that gives a maximum likelihood (for
data D[Ai]) is near θm+1 = 0 and sharply peaked,
then the likelihood for the compound model of Ωm will
generally be greater than the likelihood for Ωm+1; a
set of models that predicts the observations as well as
another but with less parameters will generally be better.
One limitation to this is that one has already chosen
the sets of models to consider in a certain way. This has
partly to do with ones preferences; do I judge a model
with various parameters on the best choice of values of
those parameters or do I judge a model on the total
parameter space given to me? The choice also has to do
with the choice of using a mathematical framework in
the first place. In principle there are an infinite number
of propositional functions that one may use as a model
that have no discernable or consistent pattern. Can the
restriction to propositional functions with consistent
patterns be justified? This question becomes manifest
in the proposed framework where we do not rely on
calculating things with respect to a predefined set of
alternative models; we may ask where those alternatives
come from and why.
Note that the framework presented here manifests a
primitive notion of simplicity for propositional functions
themselves. The probability of some Z[Ai], given no
assumptions, is proportional to 2−m where m is the
minimum number of propositions required to write Z[Ai]
in disjunctive normal form. The smaller the value of m,
the ‘simpler’ Z[Ai] is.
I speculate that a justification for induction and
simplicity comes from an assumption, J [Ai], that
restricts the set of propositional functions one may use.
This restriction could be justified by epistemological
considerations. Models with consistent patterns may
then emerge due to combinatoric reasons.
The concept of possibility that is outlined in this
article is suggestive of how scientific concepts may be
defined generally. Possibility is a pattern of propositions
within a model. Crucially, this pattern is not unique;
different models with different sizes for possibility spaces
will use different patterns (e.g., I2[Ai] and I3[Ai] are
different). Moreover, the pattern may be nested such
that the different possibilities are propositional functions
rather than basic propositions. Within this framework,
the concept of possibility cannot be defined as a form of
classification, in contrast to some other attempts at the
definition of a concept [13]. I speculate that concepts
like possibility and property may instead be associated
with algorithms.
Universality may be defined as a concept.
This definition of concept suggests a motivation for its
use. Consider an agent with data and assumption J [Ai].
There will likely be an infinite set of models to consider.
Calculation for decisions may be computationally in-
tractable. The agent may choose some scheme that best
approximates the inferences one would ideally achieve.
This scheme could involve algorithms for generating
models. It may be the case that the best algorithms
come from collections of nested concepts we may call
general hypotheses. These general hypotheses may not
give unique results but rather generate propositional
functions dependent on input. Some of these general
hypotheses may be well parametrised by mathematics.
Further work is required.
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